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Explaining Unfair Offers in Ultimatum Games 
and their Effects on Trust: 
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ABSTRACT: Unfair offers in bargaining may have disruptive effects because they may 
reduce interpersonal trust. In such situations future trust may be strongly affected by social 
accounts (i.e., apologies vs. denials). In the current paper we investigate when people are 
most likely to demand social accounts for the unfair offer (Experiment 1), and when social 
accounts will have the highest impact (Experiment 2). We hypothesized that the need for 
and impact of social accounts will be highest when the intentions of the other party are 
uncertain. The results provided support for this reasoning.
INTRODUCTION
IN THE LAST DECADE , the media have started to pay considerable attention to unethical acts within organizations and society at large. One common unethical 
situation involves the allocation of resources between different (interdependent) par-
ties in unfair and morally unacceptable ways. For example, governments sometimes 
misrepresent the actual value of resources they allocate to health care and services 
(Buchanan, 1997). Departments within organizations compete for scarce resources 
and in this process use strategies of deception that results in fi nal unfair outcomes 
to other departments. Finally, auditing companies report income in benefi ting ways 
that violate the fairness standards used by society at large (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & 
Bazerman, 2006). A common theme in these examples is that the unfair behavior of 
one party infl uences the outcomes and welfare of other parties. As such, this unfair 
behavior can be regarded as unethical by violating the rules, values and standards 
that our community employs to coordinate and cooperate (Tenbrunsel & Smith-
Crowe, 2008; cf. Jones, 1991).
The fi eld of behavioral ethics attempts in a descriptive way to examine the an-
tecedents of ethical behavior (Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). Despite this 
focus on the positive (i.e., the promotion of ethical behavior), the fi eld also has to 
address the fact, as the above examples illustrate, that we will often be confronted 
with unethical decisions. Because of our striving for an ethical climate in our orga-
nizations, research should also address the issue of how people react to unethical 
decisions. More precisely, in the present research, we develop the argument that the 
fi eld also has to realize that attention needs to be paid to how we deal with things 
when they have gone wrong in a way that trust is restored. Despite the fact that “a 
more elusive benefi t of ethics in organizations is trust” (Treviño, 2007: 49), both 
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business and behavioral ethics have devoted little attention to this issue. We argue 
that it is important to focus on trust repair, because unethical or unfair decisions are 
likely to lead to reduced trust or even distrust.
In the current article we address this question in the context of ultimatum bar-
gaining. The ultimatum game (UG; Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) is a 
simple bargaining situation that is highly suited to investigate motivated bargaining 
behavior, and in particular the question of how people react to unfair allocation 
decisions. Moreover, the UG paradigm nicely parallels the structure of many in-
terdependent relationships within organizations. In this game, two players decide 
on how to distribute a certain amount of money. One of the players, the allocator, 
offers a proportion of the money to the other player, the recipient. If the recipient 
accepts, the money is distributed in agreement with the allocator’s offer. If the re-
cipient rejects the offer, both players get nothing.
Because in the UG the inputs of both players are equal, the equality rule dictates 
that a 50–50 split is considered the fairest offer (Handgraaf, van Dijk, & De Cremer, 
2003; van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). Lower offers are likely to be experienced as unfair 
and as such can be considered as a violation of the expectations that people hold. 
In such cases, bargainers (i.e., recipients) may then want to receive some sort of 
explanation or social account for the offer from the unethical decision-maker (i.e., 
the allocator). Did the allocator intentionally make an unfair offer? Having a social 
account may be highly relevant for the recipient because it may affect the judgment 
of whether or not the allocator is to be trusted.
SOCIAL ACCOUNTS AND TRUST
The social accounts literature generally assumes that when one party violates the 
expectations of another party in, for example, an ultimatum game (e.g., making 
an unfair offer to the recipient), the way the transgressor addresses the unethical 
behavior or decision will impact on the trustworthiness of the relationship between 
both parties (Bies, 1987; Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer, Hershey, 
& Bradlow, 2006). Trust can be defi ned as the “willingness to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations about another’s behavior” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, 
& Camerer, 1998). Thus, after an unfair decision has been made, recipients of this 
unfair offer will likely feel more vulnerable and consequently display less trust 
towards the unethical decision-maker. The transgressor therefore has to account 
for the decision he/she made and can do this in a variety of ways such as showing 
remorse, explaining why such an offer was made, or even blaming another party 
(Scher & Darley, 1997; Schlenker, 1980).
However, as our above defi nition suggests, trust implies that one considers the 
other party to be of goodwill and as such that one can have positive expectations about 
what this other party will decide. For that reason, we argue that it is important that 
the decision-maker who behaved unethically clearly acknowledges responsibility and 
promises that future decisions will be different. This action of taking responsibility 
is captured in what is referred to as an apology (Goffman, 1971; Ohbuchi, Kameda, 
& Agarie, 1989; Schlenker, 1980), as done by Enron CEO Kenneth Lay, when he 
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apologized by noting that: “I take responsibility for what happened at Enron, both 
good and bad.” Alternatively, not taking up responsibility is often refl ected in the 
act of denial, as illustrated by the words of Richard Nixon, “I am not a crook.” By 
taking up responsibility the transgressor thus signals goodwill towards the victim of 
the unethical decision, but this can further be reinforced by making a promise that 
future decisions will be done otherwise. Indeed, promises have been found to facili-
tate cooperation (Schweitzer et al., 2006) as it signals positive expectations about 
future acts and decisions. Thus, taking up responsibility and promising a change in 
behavior and decisions is believed to communicate good intentions on behalf of the 
transgressor; processes that should lead to higher perceptions of trustworthiness (Ho 
& Weigelt, 2002). Interestingly, this assumption is also in line with the meta-analytic 
fi ndings of Shaw, Wild, and Colquitt (2003) showing that addressing an injustice by 
delivering an excuse is more benefi cial than simply trying to justify it.
In the present research, we will thus focus on the social accounts of apology 
and denial. Apologies will be operationalized by means of accepting responsibility 
and a promise, whereas a denial will include no acceptance of responsibility and 
no mention of a promise towards future decisions. Prior research has revealed that 
apologies can be more effective in maintaining trust, particularly when clear evidence 
concerning the violation is available (i.e., such as receiving an unfair offer; see also 
Kim et al., 2004, Experiment 2). The reason for this is that by apologizing, the of-
fender may not only communicate that his/her behavior was unacceptable but also 
that he/she intends to avoid similar violations in future interactions (Dirks, Kim, 
Cooper, & Ferrin, 2007). In contrast, a denial of an objectively unfair act does not 
communicate that the offender thinks his/her unfair behavior is unacceptable and 
thus does not signal the intention to improve his/her unfair behavior. Because the 
literature on attributions suggests that in order to elicit positive integrity attributions, 
offenders need to show willingness and put effort into restoring trust (i.e., to provide 
evidence of goodwill, cf. Skowronski & Carlston, 1992), it thus follows that a denial 
is more likely to impact negatively on interpersonal trust than an apology. Moreover, 
in line with the fi ndings of Kim and colleagues (2004), this effect is most likely to 
emerge in the context of violations of fairness (as the present research examines).
EFFECTIVENESS OF APOLOGIES VERSUS DENIALS: 
THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE TRANSGRESSOR’S INTENTIONS
It should be noted, however, that the literature is quite inconsistent in demonstrat-
ing the effectiveness of apologies relative to denials, as some studies fi nd positive 
effects of apologies (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Ohbuchi et al., 1989) whereas others 
do not (Schlenker, 1980; Riordan, Marlin, & Kellogg, 1983; Sigal, Hsu, Foodim, & 
Betman, 1988). One reason, we believe, is that prior studies looking at the provi-
sion of explanations (i.e., social accounts) for unfavorable events have treated the 
victim as a passive actor (e.g., Frantz & Bennigson, 2005; Kim et al., 2004; Scher 
& Darley, 1997). Thus, research only looked at how the party responsible for the 
offense plays an active role in the possible infl uence apologies relative to denials 
110 Business Ethics Quarterly
may exert, whereas hardly any attention has been devoted to the active role that the 
victim plays in it.
One exception is the study by Skarlicki, Folger, and Gee (2004), who exam-
ined the effects of apologies in the context of an UG. Their results showed that 
how sincere the recipient perceives the apology to be affects the effectiveness of 
an apology on behavior in an UG. In the present paper, we build on this fi nding 
by investigating the effect of uncertainty about the intentions of the transgressor. 
Based on the Skarlicki et al. (2004) fi ndings one could argue that in UG settings 
recipients are most likely to be affected by social accounts when they consider the 
social account to be informative of the intentions of the allocator (i.e., whether he/
she acknowledges to have acted unfair and promises to change in the future or not). 
We argue that after the unfavorable event of receiving an unfair offer, recipients 
may desire additional information the most when they are uncertain about what 
the intentions of the allocating party are. Sometimes the intentions of the opponent 
may become immediately clear to the recipient. For example, when someone has an 
opportunity to divide $10 with you, and offers you only $2, you may immediately 
conclude that your opponent is out to benefi t him/herself at your expense and that 
he/she is not likely to do otherwise in the future. In such situation recipients will 
perceive the allocator as having bad intentions, meaning that one is less willing to 
perceive the allocator as trustworthy and to accept his/her offer (e.g., Camerer & 
Thaler, 1995; Güth & Tietz, 1990; Handgraaf et al., 2003; Thaler, 1988; van Dijk 
& Tenbrunsel, 2005).
Importantly, however, in UG it may not always be that easy to make such a defi nite 
and strong inference about the other’s intention. As others before us have argued, 
UG situations are often characterized by information asymmetry, i.e., bargainers 
are often only partly informed about the preferences of their bargaining opponents 
(e.g., Loewenstein & Moore, 2004; Roth & Murnighan, 1982). As a consequence, 
it may not always be possible to infer the true intentions of one’s bargaining op-
ponent with certainty from an objectively unfair offer. That is, even if one would 
be convinced that one is offered a bad deal, there is a possibility that the allocator 
was not aware that it would in fact be a bad deal. That is, if the allocator does not 
know with certainty the consequences of the offer for the recipient then he or she 
may in fact have unintentionally offered a bad deal and thus should not be regarded 
as an unethical decision-maker.
To illustrate this point, it is useful to return to the example of the UG and briefl y 
discuss how asymmetric information may affect inferences about intentions in this 
setting. Consider the situation where two bargainers have to allocate 100 chips 
that could be worth more to the recipient than to the allocator (cf. Kagel, Kim, & 
Moser, 1996; van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). In this case, it would be fair and con-
sidered normative that the allocator gives more resources to him or herself than to 
the recipient. However, if the recipient is informed before the offer is made that the 
chips will be equally valuable to both the allocator and the recipient then such an 
offer is considered as unfair and potentially disruptive of the relationship. Then, 
the inference whether the allocator has bad intentions or not will depend on how 
certain one feels with respect to whether this allocator knew the information about 
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the value of the chips or not. That is, suppose that you are offered a deal that you 
consider as unfair; e.g., the allocator offers you forty chips and allocates sixty chips 
to him- or herself while you know the chips are of equal value to the both of you. If 
you are certain that the allocator knew that the value of the chips would be the same 
for both parties then the offer could be considered as an intentionally unfair one 
(because the allocator then would intentionally allocate him/herself more money). 
But if you are uncertain whether the allocator knew that the chips would be of equal 
value then the unfair offer may have been made unintentionally.
Asymmetric information in bargaining may thus evoke uncertainty about the 
intentions of one’s bargaining opponent. It is under these conditions, we argue, that 
people may have the greatest desire for social accounts explaining the existing situ-
ation of an unfair offer. Because people consider uncertainty to be an aversive state 
that may even block the ability to make decisions (Curley, Yates, & Abrams, 1986, 
Kuhn, 1997; Lopes, 1987; McGregor, 2003), they will be motivated to reduce any 
kind of uncertainty that they encounter. Indeed, one of people’s main motives is to 
control their environment and this includes understanding what happens and being 
able to control subsequent events (Fiske, 2004). As such, uncertainty is something 
that people aim to reduce.
In this respect, uncertainty about the private information available to one’s op-
ponent may turn the UG situation into a weak situation in which there are few cues 
that can be used to infer what the other party knows or does not know (Snyder & 
Ickes, 1985). Therefore, such a weak situation motivates the search for additional 
information to gain, at least, a better insight in what happened. Indeed, prior research 
on the uncertainty management model (van den Bos & Lind, 2002) has shown that 
uncertainty activates sense-making processes by relying on social information that 
can give insights into why unfairness emerged in the fi rst place. Because social 
accounts may help to provide such insights, it may therefore be expected that recipi-
ents’ desire for social accounts should be highest under conditions of uncertainty 
about what the allocating party did or did not know. Furthermore, when there is no 
uncertainty about whether the party making the unfair offer knew the exact value 
of each resource or not then the desire for a social account will be less strong as it 
may not substantially add to one’s understanding of the intentions of the allocating 
party (i.e., it is clear why the unfair offer was made). As such, this prediction can 
be seen as extending the Shaw and colleagues’ (2003) fi nding that explanations 
for injustices not only matter in contexts with instrumental, relational and moral 
implications, but also in settings where it helps to reduce uncertainty.
WHEN SOCIAL ACCOUNTS AFFECT RESPONSES
Does the strong desire for an explanation accounting for the unfair offer under uncer-
tainty also imply that the social accounts (apology vs. denial) will have the strongest 
infl uence on the responses of the recipient when uncertainty about the intentions of 
the allocating party is high (based on whether the allocating party does not know 
the value of the chips to be allocated)? In the present paper, we advocate the idea 
that if social information accounting for the unfair offer is desired the most under 
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one specifi c circumstance (i.e., uncertainty about whether the allocator does not 
know the value of the chips and thus the intentions of this allocator) then it should 
follow that the actual delivery of an apology versus a denial should also impact the 
most on people’s responses when that specifi c circumstance is salient (i.e., when 
the intentions of the other party are unknown).
What does our operationalization of an apology vs. a denial indicate in an UG? 
In the context of an UG, the provision of an apology signals that the offending party 
(i.e., the person making the unfavorable offer) acknowledges responsibility for be-
ing unfair and promises to act differently in the future. Under this condition, the 
recipient may be inclined to give the violator the benefi t of the doubt and be willing 
to cooperate by accepting his or her offer (cf. Gibson, Bottom, & Murnighan, 1999; 
Schweitzer et al., 2006). In contrast, if the offender would deny responsibility for 
the unfair offer and does not suggest any change in the future, then it becomes dif-
fi cult for the recipient to give the offender the benefi t of the doubt. As a result, the 
recipient will still feel vulnerable and doubtful about the intentions of the allocator. 
As a result, when a denial is given, victims should thus be less willing to display 
trust and accept the offer than when an apology is offered (see also Bottom, Daniels, 
Gibson, & Murnighan, 2002, for evidence that in interdependent situations denials 
prevent the re-establishment of cooperation).
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
To summarize so far, we fi rst of all predict that recipients in an UG will have a 
stronger desire for social information addressing the objectively unfair offer when 
it is uncertain what the intentions of the allocating party are (Hypothesis 1). Further, 
with respect to the effects when actual social accounts are given, we predict that 
if evidence is available that an objectively unfair offer is given (i.e., the equality-
rule is violated. Remember that fairness here is defi ned by the equality-rule when 
inputs are equal), denials will reveal lower levels of trust and cooperativeness (i.e., 
acceptance of the offer) than an apology (Hypothesis 2).
However, we expect that this social account effect will be moderated by the 
extent to which the violated party is uncertain about the intentions of the offender 
(Hypothesis 3).
More precisely, in case of Hypothesis 3, we expect that under situations of 
uncertainty about the other’s intentions, the predicted impact of an apology vs. a 
denial on the recipients’ actual responses (i.e., trust judgments and trust intentions 
such as accepting the offer) will emerge. In contrast, when there is no uncertainty 
about what the party making the offer did or did not know then the provision of 
an apology vs. a denial will be less likely to impact on recipients’ responses. If it 
is certain that the other party did know the consequences of the unfavorable offer 
then recipients may not require additional information to come to the conclusion 
that they were intentionally treated badly and can thus expect the same behavior 
again. Thus, the provision of an apology vs. a denial will not reveal a differential 
effect as bad intentions are clear and additional social information is not needed to 
reduce uncertainty about intentions. In a similar vein, if it is certain that the other 
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party did not know the exact value of the resources to be distributed then social ac-
counts may also add little to the inferential process because then it is clear that the 
other may not be held accountable and that chances are high that future decisions 
will be better. Again, the provision of an apology vs. a denial will not reveal a dif-
ferential effect because no uncertainty needs to be reduced by means of additional 
social information.
Hypothesis 1 will be examined in Experiment 1 and Hypotheses 2 and 3 will be 
examined in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 1
To test our ideas regarding the relation between informational uncertainty and 
the need for social information in bargaining, we conducted an experimental lab 
study on ultimatum bargaining (Güth et al. 1982). Participants learned that they 
and their opponent could divide 100 chips. The opponent could make an offer of 
how to distribute the 100 chips. The participant could then react to the offer. If the 
participant would accept the offer, the chips would be distributed accordingly. If 
the participant would reject, both the participant and their opponent would end up 
with zero outcomes. Before the offer was made, participants were informed that the 
chips to be divided could be worth more to the recipient than to the allocator or that 
the value could be equal to both parties. Participants then found out that the chips 
had an equal value, and subsequently learned that the opponent only offered them 
40 of the available 100 chips. In addition, it was manipulated whether participants 
were certain that the allocator either knew or did not know the exact fi nancial value 
of the resources before making the offer or whether the opponent was uncertain 
about the information that the allocator received about the fi nancial value before 
making the offer.
As stated in Hypothesis 1, it was expected that if recipients were uncertain about 
the information that the other party holds regarding the value of the resources to be 
distributed then they would desire a social account from the other party accounting 
for his or her decision. In contrast, when it was certain whether the allocating party 
possessed information about the exact value of the resources then the desire for such 
accounting information would be lower.
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred twenty-fi ve undergraduate students (ninety-three women and thirty-two 
men, average age = 19.57 years, SD = 1.74) participated voluntarily in exchange 
for course credits. They were randomly assigned to the experimental condition of 
Other’s Knowledge. This experimental condition manipulated three conditions of 
certainty, that is, a condition in which it was certain that the other knew the exact 
value of the resources to be divided (i.e., other knows), a condition in which it was 
certain that the other did not know the exact value (i.e., other does not know), and 
a condition in which it was uncertain whether the other knew the exact value of the 
resources (i.e., uncertainty).
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Experimental Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory and were seated in separate experimental cu-
bicles. They were not able to see one another and each participant’s cubicle contained 
a computer, a table, and a chair. All instructions were given via the computer. At the 
start of the instructions, participants were informed that they would take part in a 
negotiation with another person who was also present in the laboratory.
Then, the negotiation situation was explained in greater detail. It was said that 
100 chips had to be divided between themselves and the other person. Each chip 
was worth a specifi c fi nancial value that still had to be determined and that would 
be paid out to participants depending on the division. More precisely, it could be 
that each chip was worth ten Eurocents for both the participant and the other person 
(i.e., a fair offer would then be a fi fty–fi fty split). On the other hand, it could also be 
the case that each chip was worth fi fteen Eurocents for the participant and only ten 
Eurocents for the other person (i.e., a fair offer would then be a sixty–forty split). 
Then, it was communicated that for this study the chips would be of equal worth to 
both the participant and the other person (i.e., ten Eurocents). Thereafter, it was made 
clear to participants that it was decided randomly that the other person would be the 
one making the offer and that the participant would be the recipient. It was further 
explained that if the recipient would accept the offer then the allocation of the 100 
chips would be as offered. However, if the recipient would not accept the offer, both 
the recipient and the allocator would get nothing. Then, participants responded to a 
series of questions assessing whether they accurately understood the game situation 
that was presented. In case participants answered incorrectly to these questions the 
correct answer was provided and the question was asked again.
After this, the Uncertainty manipulation was introduced. Participants were fi rst 
told that the other person was asked to make an offer. It was also said that the value 
of the chips that had to be allocated could be worth either ten Eurocents for each or 
ten Eurocents for the allocator and fi fteen Eurocents for the recipient. It was then 
communicated that the experimenter decided that the value would be ten Eurocents 
for both the participant and the other. Meanwhile, the allocator made the offer and 
as such it was not clear yet whether this person knew the exact value or not when 
he or she made the offer. Subsequently, participants received an email from the ex-
perimenter informing them whether the allocator made the offer without knowing 
the exact fi nancial value of the resources or not. It was emphasized that the other 
person did not know that the experimenter communicated this information.
In the other knows condition participants read, “The other person (who made you 
an offer) defi nitely knows the exact value of the chips.” In the other does not know 
condition participants read, “The other person (who made you an offer) defi nitely 
does not know the exact value of the chips.” In the uncertainty condition participants 
read, “It may be possible that the other person (who made you an offer) found out 
about the exact value of the chips before making the offer, but on the other hand he 
may not have found out. We will try to fi nd out as quickly as possible.”
After this information was given, participants received the offer of the other per-
son. The email mentioned that the other person had decided to allocate sixty chips 
to himself and forty chips to the recipient. (Note that sixty–forty would be a fair 
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offer if the value if the chips for the recipient would be fi fteen Eurocents and ten 
Eurocents for the one making the offer, However, because the exact value was ten 
Eurocents for each, this offer was unfair, as it violated the equality-rule (Messick, 
1993; van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004).
Then, the dependent measures of Experiment 1 were solicited. All items were 
responded to on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). To check for the 
effectiveness of the Uncertainty manipulation, participants were asked to what extent 
they felt uncertain whether the other knew the exact value of the chips. After the 
offer was presented, participants were asked how fair they evaluated the offer to be 
(1 = very unfair, 7 = very fair). Then, participants’ desire for social information was 
assessed by means of three items. They were asked to what extent they wanted to 
“ask an explanation from the other,” “ask the other to provide information about his 
situation,” and “know whether the other knew the exact value.” These items were 
combined to form one composite score (Cronbach’s a = .85). Finally, the experiment 
was stopped and participants were debriefed, thanked and dismissed.
Results
Manipulation Check
A one-way ANOVA on the uncertainty manipulation check score revealed a sig-
nifi cant main effect of Other’s Knowledge, F(2, 122) = 22.37, p < .001, h2 = .26. 
Planned comparisons showed that participants in the uncertainty condition agreed 
signifi cantly more with this statement than those in the other does not know condi-
tion (Ms = 4.19 vs. 3.42, SDs = 1.63 and 1.96, respectively; t = -1.96, p = .05) and 
those in the other knows condition (M = 1.80, SD = 1.19, t = -7.48, p < .001). Also 
a signifi cant difference was found between the other does not know condition and 
the other knows condition (t = -4.46, p < .001). Thus, our uncertainty manipulation 
successfully distinguished the three levels of uncertainty.
A one-way ANOVA on how fairly the offer was perceived revealed no signifi cant 
effect, Other’s Knowledge, F(1, 122) < 1, p < .57, h2 = .00. Further, the average 
score (M = 3.55) pointed out that the offer was evaluated as signifi cantly less fair 
than the midpoint of the scale (t = -3.60, p < 001). Thus, as expected, participants 
also perceived the sixty–forty offer as an unfair decision.
Desire for Social Information
A one-way ANOVA revealed a signifi cant effect of Other’s Knowledge, F(2, 122) 
= 3.58, p < .05, h2 = .06. Planned comparisons, fi rst of all, showed that participants 
in the other knows condition did not differ from those in the other does not know 
condition in wanting to receive an explanation from the allocator concerning his or 
her offer (Ms = 3.77 vs. 3.66, SDs = 1.27 and 1.68; respectively; t = .33, p = .74). 
Further, in line with Hypothesis 1, participants in the uncertainty condition (M = 
4.42, SD = 1.23) expressed a stronger desire to receive social information relative 
to those participants in the other knows condition (t = - 2.34, p < .05) and the other 
does not know condition (t = - 2.38, p < .05). These analyses thus show that when it 
was uncertain whether the allocator knew the exact value of the chips to be allocated 
then more social information was desired by the recipients.
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Discussion
As expected, the results of Experiment 1 showed that information about an unfavor-
able offer was more desired when participants were uncertain whether the allocator 
possessed accurate knowledge about the fi nancial value of the chips. Participants 
were less interested in receiving an explanation when they were certain that the 
allocator knew the fi nancial value or when they were certain that allocator did not 
know this value. These fi ndings therefore can be seen as supportive of our idea that 
under conditions of uncertainty about what the transgressor knew (relative to the 
certainty conditions) social information is needed to make assumptions about the 
intentions of the other party.
In study 2, we wanted to extend the fi ndings of study 1 by testing whether the 
stronger desire for social information addressing an unfair offer would also imply 
that specifi c social information such as an apology versus a denial would infl u-
ence recipients’ decisions and inferences under conditions of uncertainty about the 
transgressor’s knowledge. Moreover, would this also imply that under conditions 
of certainty such social accounts would be discounted more and thus reveal less 
infl uence on the responses of the recipient? Therefore, in Experiment 2 we ma-
nipulated the actual provision of a social account by having the allocator apologize 
(i.e., assume responsibility for the offer and promise to do better next time) or deny 
responsibility for the offer and not making a promise at all.
EXPERIMENT 2
The social account manipulation for Experiment 2—the provision of an apology vs. 
a denial—was based on prior research in the area of trust repair (Kim et al., 2004). 
More precisely, in the apology condition, the allocator apologized for the unfavor-
able offer (thus expressing that he had the intention to be unfair) and promised to 
do better next time (see also Schweitzer et al., 2006). In the denial condition, the 
allocator denied that he had the intention to be unfair and thus rejected any respon-
sibility regarding the unfair offer and made no promise for the future. As outlined 
in our introduction, we expect that denials after an unfair offer would impact less 
positively on people’s responses than an apology that could mitigate the unfair 
action a bit. Further, based on the above, we expected that this effect of a social ac-
count would reveal a signifi cant effect in the uncertainty condition but not in both 
certainty conditions.
Because social accounts have been examined in the context of trust and par-
ticularly trust repair (see, e.g., Kim et al., 2004; Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 
2006), we focused on trust as our dependent measure. We assessed trust by means 
of judgments. Judgments include asking people how trustworthy and respectable 
they perceive the other party to be and are measures commonly used in the psycho-
logical tradition of trust (Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006; Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995).
Taken together, our prediction was thus that in the uncertainty condition the al-
locating party would be perceived as less trustworthy when a denial relative to an 
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apology was communicated. In both certainty conditions, no effect of the social 
account manipulation (apology vs. denial) was expected on both trust indications.
Method
Participants and Design
One hundred and thirty undergraduate students (108 women and twenty-two men, 
average age = 19.24 years, SD = 3.24) participated voluntarily in exchange for 
course credits. They were randomly assigned to a 2 (Social account: Apology vs. 
denial) x 3 (Other’s Knowledge: Other knows, Other does not know, Uncertainty) 
between-subjects factorial design.
Experimental Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory and were seated in separate experimental cu-
bicles. They were not able to see one another and each participant’s cubicle contained 
a computer, a table, and a chair. All instructions were given via the computer. At the 
start of the instructions, participants were informed that they would take part in a 
negotiation with another person who was also present in the laboratory.
Then, the negotiation situation was explained in greater detail. As in Experiment 
1, it was said that 100 chips had to be divided between themselves and the other 
person and that the fi nancial value would be paid out to the participants. The ma-
nipulation of Uncertainty was exactly the same as in Experiment 1. Also, following 
the same procedures as in Experiment 1, the offer made by the other person was 
presented on the computer screen. The offer was again sixty to the other person 
and forty to self.
After this information was given, the social account manipulation was introduced. 
It was explained to participants that when the other person had made his or her of-
fer, this person was informed that the recipient of his/her offer (i.e., the participant) 
knew that each chip was worth ten Eurocents for both parties. It was also made 
clear to participants that the person making the offer was not aware whether the 
recipient (i.e., the participant in this study) knew whether the allocating party did 
know, did defi nitely not know, or was uncertain about the exact fi nancial value of 
the chips when he/she made the offer. Then, it was mentioned to participants that 
the person who made the offer was asked to think about the offer that he/she made 
and what kind of explanation he/she wanted to communicate to the recipient (i.e., 
the participant in this study). As a response to this question, the person making the 
offer wrote a brief email that now was sent to the participant. Then, participants 
received the message. Both social account conditions were based on the manipulation 
of Kim et al. (2004). In the apology condition, participants read: “I’m sorry about 
the offer that I just made. I will try to do better next time.” In the denial condition, 
participants read: “I do not feel responsible for the offer that I made and its possible 
consequences. I deny bad intentions from my side.”
Then, the dependent measures of Experiment 2 were solicited. All items were 
responded to on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much so). To check for the 
effectiveness of the Uncertainty manipulation, participants were asked the follow-
ing questions. More precisely, they were asked to what extent they felt “uncertain 
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whether the other knew the exact value of the chips.” Then, participants were asked 
to what extent the other did “know the exact value of the chips,” and “defi nitely not 
know the exact value of the chips (reversed-scored).” These two items were com-
bined to form a certainty score (r = .64, p < .001). As in Experiment 1, participants 
were asked how fair they evaluated the offer to be (1 = very unfair, 7 = very fair). 
To check for the effectiveness of the social account manipulation, participants were 
asked to what extent the other party “apologized” and “denied responsibility” for the 
offer. Thereafter, trust was assessed by measuring participants’ perceptions of the 
other’s trustworthiness: To what extent do you consider your negotiation partner to 
be a “respectable” and “trustworthy” person (r = .62, p < .001). Finally, participants 
were debriefed, thanked and dismissed.
Results
Manipulation Checks
A 2 x 3 ANOVA on the certainty score revealed only a signifi cant main effect of 
Other’s Knowledge, F(2, 124) = 132.70, p < .001, h2 = .68. Planned comparisons 
showed that participants in the other knows condition were much more certain 
about the value of the chips than those in other does not know condition (Ms = 6.45 
vs. 2.18, SDs = 0.97 and 1.34, respectively; t = 17.31, p < .001) and those in the 
uncertainty condition (M = 3.74, SD = 1.39, t = 10.43, p < .001). Also a signifi cant 
difference was found between the other does not know condition and the uncertainty 
condition (t = -5.49, p < .001).
A 2 x 3 ANOVA on the question how uncertain one felt about whether the other 
knew the exact value of the chips revealed only a signifi cant main effect of Other’s 
Knowledge, F(2, 124) = 9.66, p < .001, h2 = .14. Planned comparisons showed that 
participants in the uncertainty condition agreed signifi cantly more with this statement 
than those in other does not know condition (Ms = 3.67 vs. 2.51, SDs = 1.61 and 
1.84, respectively; t = -2.81, p < .01) and those in the other knows condition (M = 
1.96, SD = 1.61, t = -4.54, p < .001). No signifi cant difference was found between the 
other does not know condition and the other knows condition (t = -1.47, p < .15).
A 2 x 3 ANOVA on the question whether the other party apologized for the offer 
revealed only a signifi cant main effect of Social account, F(1, 124) = 235.23, p < 
.001, h2 = .66, showing that participants in the apology condition considered the 
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Ratings of Trustworthiness as a Function of Other’s 
Knowledge and Social Account
Other’s Knowledge 
Social Account
Uncertain Other knows Other does not know
M SD M SD M SD
Trustworthiness
Apology 4.60 1.17  4.34 1.19 4.25 1.18
Denial 3.44 1.23 3.72 1.12 4.39 1.52
Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating higher ratings of trustworthiness.
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other party as more apologizing than those in the denial condition (Ms = 6.26 vs. 
2.21; SDs = 1.06 and 1.83; respectively).
A 2 x 3 ANOVA on the question whether the other party denied responsibility 
for the offer revealed only a signifi cant main effect of Social account, F(1, 124) = 
30.81, p < .001, h2 = .20, showing that participants in the denial condition considered 
the other party to deny responsibility more than those in the apology condition (Ms 
= 5.16 vs. 3.17; SDs = 1.97 and 2.05; respectively). All in all, these fi ndings show 
that our manipulations were very successful.
A 2 x 3 ANOVA on how fairly the offer was perceived revealed no signifi cant 
effects: Social account, F(1, 124) = 6.10, p < .66, h2 = .00; Other’s Knowledge, 
F(1, 124) < 1, p < .71, h2 = .00, and Interaction, F(1, 124) = 2.13, p < .13, h2 = .03. 
Further, the average score (M = 3.53) pointed out that the offer was evaluated as 
signifi cantly less fair than the midpoint of the scale (t = -3.93, p < 001). Thus, as 
expected, participants also perceived the sixty–forty offer as an unfair decision.
Trust Responses
A 2 x 3 ANOVA on the average trustworthiness perception score revealed a signifi cant 
main effect of Social account, F(1, 124) = 6.10, p < .05, h2 = .05, thereby supporting 
Hypothesis 2. That is, participants evaluated the other as less trustworthy when a 
denial relative to an apology was given (Ms = 3.85 vs. 4.40; SDs = 1.35 and 1.17; 
respectively). Also, a signifi cant interaction between Social account and Other’s 
Knowledge emerged, F(2, 124) = 2.92, p = .05, h2 = .05 (see Table 1 for the means 
and standard deviations and Figure 1 for a visual representation).
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
Uncertain Other Knows Other Does Not
Know
Apology
Denial
Figure 1. Participants’ Ratings of Trustworthiness as a Function of Other’s Knowledge and Social Account 
(Higher Values represent Higher Trust)
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To analyze further the interaction we conducted several planned comparisons. 
Planned comparisons testing the effect of the social account manipulation within 
each condition of the Other’s Knowledge manipulation showed that, as expected by 
Hypothesis 3, social accounts had a signifi cant effect within the uncertainty condition 
(t = 3.05, p < .005), but not within the other knows condition (t = 1.75, p = .09), and 
the other does not know condition (t = -.34, p < .74). Thus, a denial revealed lower 
trust than an apology, but this was only true within the uncertainty condition.
Further analyses testing the effect of each social account across the uncertainty 
conditions showed that with respect to the effect of a denial no signifi cant differ-
ence was found between the other knows condition and the other does not know 
condition (t = -1.65, p < .11). Also, no signifi cant difference was found between 
the other knows condition and the uncertainty condition (t = .75, p < .46). Finally, 
a signifi cant difference was found between the other does not know condition and 
the uncertainty condition (t = 2.10, p < .05). These fi ndings indicate that particularly 
in the uncertainty condition a denial revealed low levels of trust.
With respect to the effect of an apology no signifi cant differences were found 
between the other knows condition and the other does not know condition (t = .25, p 
< .81), between the other knows condition and the uncertainty condition (t = -.75, p 
< .46), and between the other does not know condition and the uncertainty condition 
(t = -1.01, p < .32). We will discuss this issue in the general discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across two experimental studies several important fi ndings emerged addressing 
the questions when a social account is desired the most and when it will exert the 
most infl uence on the other’s party responses. The fi rst important fi nding is that, in 
Experiment 1, recipients expressed a stronger desire to receive social information 
that could address the unfair offer when they were uncertain whether the allocating 
party knew the exact value of the resources that had to be divided. When it was certain 
that the allocating party knew the exact value or did defi nitely not know the exact 
value of these resources, then the desire for such social information was signifi cantly 
less. Elaborating on this fi nding in Experiment 2, we manipulated the provision of 
a social account (i.e., apology vs. denial). Results showed that social accounts had 
an impact on recipients’ trust judgments in such a way that the provision of a denial 
led to lower judgments of trustworthiness relative to when an apology was offered. 
However, this effect only emerged under circumstances where the recipient was 
uncertain whether the allocating party knew the exact fi nancial value of the units 
or not. Again, when it was certain that this party knew or did not know the specifi c 
value, then social accounts did not affect recipients’ trust judgments.
These fi ndings suggest that in bargaining situations social accounts only lead to 
signifi cant effects if sense has to be made of the intentions of the allocating party. 
In bargaining situations, uncertainty about the intentions of the allocating party is 
a situation that is preferably avoided (cf. Kuhn, 1997; Lopes, 1987), and recipients 
may therefore search for additional information on which they base their inferences 
and subsequently their own decisions on (cf. van den Bos & Lind, 2002). One such 
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type of information is how the allocating party explains and accounts for the unfair 
offer. Our results show that in the case of such an uncertain situation, a denial more 
negatively impacts on people’s trust reactions than the provision of an apology.
From the perspective of business ethics research, our results are important because 
they highlight that it is important to understand better how people react to unethi-
cal failures and what kind of information they desire when ethical transgressions 
emerge. Further, these results also emphasize the need for ethical transgressors 
to focus more on the aftermath of an ethical failure. Specifi cally, it stresses the 
value for transgressors to zoom in on how to account best for an ethical failure. 
The results are also important for more specifi c reasons. First of all, the present 
results provide insights that may explain why prior research has illustrated that 
the provision of social accounts such as apologies and denials reveal inconsistent 
effects and that therefore a need exists to identify boundary conditions of social 
accounts (cf. Kellerman, 2006). Indeed, we argued and demonstrated that, fi rst of 
all, it is not always the case that recipients of unfair offers desire the provision of 
an explanation accounting for the transgression. When certainty exists about the 
intentions of the allocator acknowledging or denying responsibility will make no 
difference. Moreover, building on this observation we also demonstrated that it is 
exactly under the conditions where people desire social accounts most strongly that 
social accounts impact the most on people’s trust reactions. Thus, our fi ndings em-
phasize the importance of looking at conditions that infl uence when people desire, 
and respond the most to, social accounts.
Second, in a related manner, the studies contribute to the literature because they 
focused on the perspective of the recipient. Only few studies have focused on iden-
tifying conditions under which social accounts impact on people’s responses (De 
Cremer & Schouten, 2008; Frantz & Bennigson, 2005; Kim et al., 2004; Scher & 
Darley, 1997). Most of these studies have been limited in scope because they did 
not consider the role that the recipient plays in testing the impact of a social account 
(for an exception see Skarlicki et al., 2004). Therefore, an important contribution 
of our present research lies exactly in including the perspective of the recipient. 
Because the social account that a transgressor communicates is directed towards 
the other party, it is important to take into account how this other party (i.e., the 
offended party) evaluates and perceives the transgression (i.e., the unfair offer in 
the present study). As we have shown, knowing when an explanation is desired the 
most helps in understanding when social accounts will have an impact on people’s 
trust reactions.
Third, only a relatively small number of experimental studies have employed 
mixed-motive situations to examine the effectiveness of social accounts (e.g., 
Gibson et al., 1999; Schweitzer et al., 2006; Bottom et al., 2002). Until now, most 
of these studies (including our own study) show that denials reveal more negative 
effects than apologies do. This effect follows the fi ndings of Kim and colleagues 
(2004) who showed that once objective evidence of the transgression is available 
then acknowledging responsibility (i.e., an apology) will produce better effects than 
not doing this (i.e., a denial). In our present studies, the offer was clearly unfair (see 
also participants’ fairness perceptions) and under such circumstances it was indeed 
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shown that a denial evoked lower trust reactions than the communication of an 
apology. However, as mentioned earlier, our fi ndings go beyond demonstrating this 
effect by showing that the impact of these social accounts is dependent on a variable 
that is highly relevant in negotiations, that is, uncertainty about the knowledge that 
the allocating party possesses.
On a related note, our planned comparisons in Experiment 2 also revealed some 
more interesting fi ndings. That is, the effect of apologies did not differ signifi cantly 
across the other’s knowledge conditions (other knows the value, other does not know 
the value, or is uncertain about the value), whereas the effect of a denial in the un-
certainty condition was signifi cantly different (i.e., revealing lower trust reactions) 
from its effect in the two certainty conditions. These fi ndings thus provide additional 
evidence that in the case of a clear and objectively unfair allocation (i.e., the equality 
rule is violated) a denial seems to make things even worse as no responsibility is 
acknowledged and no sense of the unfair offer can be made, whereas acknowledging 
responsibility by means of an apology appears to mitigate the violating act.
Our results have also practical implications. Specifi cally, they show that when 
managing ethical failures it is necessary to identify what is known about the mo-
tives of the transgressor. If the victims of the ethical failure are ambiguous about 
the motives of the transgressor then an apology appears to be very useful in miti-
gating potential confl icts. However, if suffi cient information is available to infer 
the intention of the transgressor then social accounts are not useful in softening 
the resulting confl ict. One way to try to restore trust in those circumstances may 
then be to repay the fi nancial inequality that was introduced by the unfair alloca-
tion. These suggestions make thus clear that in mediating or managing unethical 
failures resulting in lowered trust it is necessary to evaluate the perspective of the 
victim in greater detail.
Before closing, we mention some potential limitations. A fi rst potential limitation 
is that our experimental design does not allow us to conclude whether our predicted 
effects were found because people appreciated the apology or because they got upset 
when being presented with a denial. To explore this question in a more elaborate 
manner, future research could include a control condition (no apology and no denial). 
Including such a control condition could give us further insights into the concrete 
effects of our social account manipulation on people’s trust responses, particularly 
when one is uncertain about the intentions of the allocating party.
On a related note, one could also argue that our manipulations of apology and 
denial did not reveal much information about the initial intentions of the transgressor. 
In our introduction, we noted that trust can be restored (at least to a certain degree) 
if the transgressor clearly articulates intentions of goodwill. We reasoned that this 
can be done by acknowledging responsibility for the unfair decision and making 
a promise that future decisions will be different. This information was included 
in our operationalization of the apology. Of course, this does not reveal what the 
intentions of the transgressor were in making an unfair division. As such, in the 
present paper, intentions of the transgressor clearly referred to future intentions 
and less so to initial intentions. More research is needed to examine whether social 
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accounts including information relevant to the initial intentions of a transgressor 
would reveal the same results.
Another potential limitation is that we only addressed the effects of two social 
accounts: apologies and denials. Granted, these two types have received the most 
attention to date, but it still remains to be tested whether the present fi ndings gen-
eralize to the effects of other social accounts. One possible other social account 
that can be considered as relevant to study in bargaining situations is reticence (see 
Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007). For example, in politics parties negotiating 
also often refuse to say anything and simply respond with a “no comment.” In ulti-
matum bargaining, reticence may communicate different things. That is, recipients 
may use the heuristic that if they say nothing they communicate that they agree with 
the offer of the allocator. Alternatively, saying nothing may also increase further 
ambiguity surrounding an unfair offer. Future research is needed to examine these 
kinds of predictions.
A fi nal potential limitation involves the use of our single simple measure of trust. 
Although judgments of trust (as the one we used in our research) are often used in 
trust research, future research would be advised to also include behavioral measures 
of trust. In line with the behavioral tradition of trust research, behavioral measures of 
trust can take the form of measures of cooperation as they refl ect people’s willing-
ness to be vulnerable to the decisions of another party; thus communicating trust 
in the other party (cf. Rousseau et al., 1998). Other behavioral measures of trust 
may also include, for example, giving the victim of the trust violation a choice to 
communicate information that can put him/her at risk (for being exploited).
To conclude, the present research is the fi rst (at least to our knowledge) to system-
atically examine under which conditions social accounts are desired and when they 
impact the most on people’s trust reactions. In doing this, we advocated the strategy 
to consider the active role that the recipient plays in this process. Our results indeed 
showed that how certain versus uncertain the recipient is concerning the knowledge 
that the allocating party has about the fi nancial value of the units to be distributed 
affects the impact of social accounts on trust judgments and behavioral intentions. 
Building on these fi ndings, it is our hope that future business and behavioral ethics 
research will, fi rst of all, pay more attention to the question of how to deal with things 
when they have gone wrong (i.e., when unethical decisions are made) and what the 
antecedents are that make one’s efforts to account for the unethical decision more 
effective. Our world is a complex place and managers within organizations have to 
make decisions relatively quickly thereby increasing chances for unethical behavior 
to emerge. In order to make sure that such ethical violations do not spoil the ethical 
climate of an organization immediately we need to understand better how unethical 
violations can be managed in effective and restoring ways.
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